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A WAY TO SOLVE THE EURO -
PEAN BALANCE OF PAYMENTS




For a good two years now, balance of payments dise-
quilibria and government debts have grown into a
European balance of payments crisis. This means that
payment obligations entered before, i.e. the debts of
an individual member state or a group of members,
respectively, of the European Economic and Monet  -
ary Union (EMU) have proven to be prohibitive. The
crisis has deepened further following the Euro
Summit at the end of July and end of October 2011
respectively and is still awaiting an effective and sus-
tainable solution. 
To elucidate: it is important to emphasise that nei-
ther government debt nor balance of payments
imbalances as such must generally present a prob-
lem. Quite the contrary, under certain circumstances
it is economically entirely rational for businesses or
government to incur debt. This is in particular the
case if the debts are used for investment, i.e. if gov-
ernments invest in education, health and infrastruc-
ture – to mention only some cases – or if private
businesses modernise or expand their production
facilities. The theory of the debt cycle shows very
clearly that it is often imperative to incur debt in
order to use the income from the investments that
are made with the help of this debt, to repay the debt
including interest and to raise one’s own welfare.
Unfortunately, however, today we are not talking
about debt that is used in this way; the governments
concerned have used their debts primarily for con-
sumption because it was politically rewarding to
impart short-term impetus. The theory of time
inconsistency explains this behaviour quite well. 
This paper will deal briefly with the causes of the
balance of payments crisis in the euro area, as only
knowledge of the causes can bring about a solution
of the problem with political means. We then look at
the issue of direct price and quantity effects in the
course of continuing economic integration of
European core and periphery countries that trig-
gered the debt dynamics in the euro area. In particu-
lar, we shall deal with institutional flaws of EMU
that promote the debt dynamics and impede a solu-
tion of the European balance of payments crisis. In
the course of discussing institutional weaknesses, the
shortcomings of the past European crisis manage-
ment will become clear. We conclude our discussion
by suggesting that alternative approaches be taken to
solve the European balance of payments crisis effec-
tively and in a sustained way. In contrast to some
arguments in the public debate, our approach is to
‘take a chance on market solutions!’ 
Causes of the European balance of payments crisis 1:
price and quantity effects 
The causes of the debt dynamics in the euro area that
have led to a European balance of payments crisis are
complex. In economic terms, price and quantity
effects can be seen to play a major role. 
The fact that the European balance of payments cri-
sis has primarily become visible at the periphery of
the euro area can be traced in particular to the ini-
tially observable price effects of economic integra-
tion. The establishment of a common monetary area
led to an extraordinary decline in the risk premiums
in the periphery. Such a price effect resulted quasi
automatically in an expansion of the credit volume
in these countries. In the case of a small open econ-
omy in a common currency area, the subsequent
excess demand in the goods markets leads to a pure-
ly quantitative economic adjustment in the form of
current account deficits that in a common currency
area cannot be offset by an exchange-rate price
adjustment mechanism. The credit-induced increase
of purchasing power results in a demand increase
even for so-called non-tradable goods, of which
prices then rise. These are partly intermediate prod- * University of Jena.ucts of the producers of internationally tradable
goods that cannot become more expensive because
of the law of one price in international trade. If such
cost pressures on domestic suppliers of tradable
goods cannot be offset by productivity gains, the
corresponding real appreciation will result in declin-
ing competitiveness of the firms in the peripheral
countries of the euro area and thus in a long-term
rising risk of a balance of payments crisis. This risk
would be smaller under flexible exchange rates, as a
depreciation of the currencies of net debtor coun-
tries would stop the capital inflows and would
restore, at least in part, price competitiveness. 
Under competitive conditions an inefficient expan-
sion of credit may also result. This occurs if, for
example, no account is taken of the pro-cyclicality of
asset price changes in the context of the collateralisa-
tion of borrowing agreements. In such a case a pecu-
niary externality in the aggregate credit volume
exists, which is not internalised on a microeconomic
level within the private financial sector (Lorenzoni
2008). Borrowing agreements are incomplete agree-
ments. Especially for the financing of investment pro-
jects some form of collateralisation is demanded to
counteract the problem of uncertain future repay-
ments. As the future is uncertain per se, a real invest-
ment may turn out to be insufficiently profitable, so
that the borrower’s ability to repay the loan diminish-
es or credit claims may even become uncollectible.
Because of the excess demand generated by credit,
the asset value of the collateral may increase so that
endogenous credit cycles are started. If, because of
an exogenous shock, a sufficiently large volume of
credits become bad, a problem in the macroeconom-
ic aggregate may ensue, thus, turning the credit cycle
into a deflationary phase. The effect of each individ-
ual borrowing agreement on aggregate income is of
course marginal; that is why under certain conditions
the beneficiaries of the contract cannot appropriate-
ly price in any economies of scale, resulting in the
mentioned pecuniary externality, i.e. an excessive vol-
ume of credit. The result is a trend to an excessive
degree of indebtedness in the economy: market fail-
ure is the result. 
Excessive growth of the credit volume and corre-
sponding debt dynamics in the euro area are fre-
quently accompanied by a qualitative deterioration of
credit portfolios from a macroeconomic point of view.
This may be traced e.g. to behavioural risks (too high
a preference for the present, moral hazard). Thus,
excessive credit demand may be explained by deman-
ders – be they households, businesses or public
authorities – rating present consumption too high.
Time-inconsistent behaviour may be responsible for
this. Governments choose and publish an optimal
level of future debt. After the debt is incurred, the
chosen level is no longer optimal, as the market agents
react to the announcement. For example, before an
election it may then be optimal for the government at
a later point in time to incur more debt in order e.g. to
increase social spending and to draw the mostly
myopic electorate onto their side. Furthermore, it may
be possible for governments, against the background
of an expected bailout, to assent to a non-sustainable
indebtedness. This applies all the more if there are
already examples in the euro area or if rules to prevent
moral hazard have proven too weak. 
Most notably, it were the price and quantity effects in
credit transactions that set in train the debt dynamics
upon the introduction of the common currency which
are currently manifesting themselves in a European
balance of payments crisis. Of course, with the no-
bail out clause and the Stability and Growth Pact
there were also institutional precautions that were
meant to inhibit such developments. But the mecha-
nisms turned out to be non-credible and ineffective.
Additional institutional flaws have even promoted the
current development. 
Causes of the European balance of payments crisis 2:
institutional flaws 
Aside from the described price and quantity effects,
the debt dynamic in the euro area is due to specifics of
the common currency area. The special characteristics
of EMU resulting in the European balance of pay-
ments crisis comprise, first, lacking institutional safe-
guards of the credibility of promises to pay especially
of demand deposits in the banking sector on the
European level. Second, construction flaws in the
common monetary transaction system and, third,
lacking institutional precautionary measures for the
case of a threatening insolvency of individual euro
members. 
The first aspect concerns the institutional safeguard
of promises to pay. From our point of view, a
Europeanised financial sector, i.e. especially the bank-
ing sector and its deposits, is comparatively more frag-
ile than would be the case in a national framework.
The reason is that on the national level – if deposit
insurance funds and similar measures should be used
up – the safeguard of all promises to pay in the form
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of deposits can be guaranteed by the liability of the
taxpayer, so that a bank run can be averted. Before the
introduction of the euro, there were always the respec-
tive central banks as direct lender of last resort (LLR)
on the national level. The institutional safeguard of
deposits via central banks as well as especially that via
taxpayers, functions only indirectly on the European
level or in relatively unreliable ways (Congdon 1998).
Admittedly, in a Europeanised or globalised financial
sector, it is always more difficult to fulfil the functions
of a lender of last resort. Yet, within the euro area
there should have been at least more political interest
in and serious analyses of this issue. For example,
Neumann (2011) has pointed out that the probability
of a run on the banks of a euro member is high. His
argument is based, however, on the European mone-
tary payment mechanism Target2 offering ideal pre-
requisites for capital flight into other EMU member
states, raising the probability of a bank run. If this
problem had been considered early on, a second con-
struction flaw could possibly have been avoided.
From our point of view, the Target2 system conse-
quently represents the second institutional fault of
EMU. In the Target2 debate, initiated by Hans-
Werner Sinn, Fahrholz and Freytag (2011) have
shown that the common payment system inter alia
permits continued financing of merchandise
imports. Thus, the Target2 system indeed represents
a kind of ‘credit replacement policy’ (Sinn 2011;
Sinn and Wollmershäuser 2011) for de facto insol-
vent euro members. In general, a transfer of
resources transmitted by the private financial sector
leads to an efficient allocation of capital between
core and periphery countries in Europe; in that case,
a current account deficit is, as mentioned, no prob-
lem. The Target2 system also permits inefficient and
unplanned current account transactions. Prior to the
European balance of payments crisis the lack of a
price adjustment mechanism could not prevent the
build-up of excessive debt. In the crisis private capi-
tal flows stopped, but the existing Target2 system
permits further financing of non-competitive or
non-sustainable production structures, even after a
failure of the private financial sector. As a conse-
quence total indebtedness in the euro area will con-
tinue to increase. Promises to pay or claims will now
be increasingly kept in the form of central bank
money in the Eurosystem. That corresponding
changes in net asset positions will become even more
improbable, given that the additional debt generated
by the Target2 system even adds to unsustainable
debt levels. Therefore this additional debt only leads
to an aggravation of the European balance of pay-
ments crisis. 
The above-mentioned capital flight within the euro
area points to a third flaw. The institutional provi-
sions for a functioning EMU lack credible rules for
dealing with balance of payments crises, i.e. especial-
ly bankruptcy or exit rules for insolvent euro mem-
bers. Fahrholz und Wójcik (2010) have pointed out
that clearly defined rules for an (even conditional or
temporary) exit from the euro area would clarify the
opportunity costs of excessive indebtedness or exces-
sive credit growth. Put differently: a future balance of
payments crisis could then be prevented as only effi-
cient current account balances would be generated. At
the same time, such an institutional provision would
ensure that latently insolvent euro members could not
play off the still prevailing institutional uncertainty in
the euro area against other EMU members. In con-
trast to the present design of EMU, with clearly
defined insolvency or exit rules the build-up of exces-
sive stocks of debt would be made more expensive by
the private financial sector and thus prevented. The
more credible the institutional provisions for an
orderly exit from a common currency area, the less is
the potential for a European balance of payments cri-
sis. But also after the event – i.e. without correspond-
ing exit rules today – an exit may be worth consider-
ing: for the country concerned, an exit would have the
disadvantage of the debts likely becoming much more
expensive in domestic currency, assuming that the exit
would result in a depreciation of the new (old) cur-
rency. But it would have the advantage of the depreci-
ation increasing the competitiveness of the domestic
industry. 
Past attempts at solving the problem: too weak and not
directed at the causes 
This short analysis in our short paper shows that a
solution of the European balance of payments crisis
cannot consist of giving and mutually guaranteeing
more and more payment promises, i.e. debts. But this is
where the past rescue program having been introduced
bit by bit since the spring of 2010 is leading. All rescue
operations, based on this approach, have only aggra-
vated the European balance of payments crisis. Let us
first take a brief look at the proposed solution present-
ly under discussion, to be followed by an alternative
approach to effective and more efficient solutions. 
The debate following the Euro Summit of 21 July
2011 is dominated by the topics of ‘debt restructuring’and ‘leverage of the rescue package’, i.e. the present
European Financial Stabilisation Facility (EFSF) and
the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) from 2013.
What has been created with the new mandate of the
EFSF, which possibly even provides for preventive
credit lines for potentially insolvent euro members, is
the fiscal policy counterpart of a monetary policy
LLR function. Whereas, however, according to the
Bagehot rule, interventions ought to be unlimited in
size, the funds of the ESFS are limited in volume. As
desirable as a limitation of the solidarity liability in
the euro area appears to be, so precarious is the effect
of an explicit ceiling on the behaviour of the private
financial sector. Because this will only lead to a run on
the funds of the rescue package, as within the private
financial sector there is competition for shifting ‘toxic’
government bonds to the public sector, so that the
new mandate of the EFSF intensifies the European
balance of payments crisis. The result may be a
vicious circle: an expansion of the rescue packages –
as planned in the October 2011 package – will encour-
age the banks to transfer ever bigger amounts of gov-
ernment bonds to the periphery. This crisis then per-
petuates itself, as the peripheral countries cannot per-
manently restructure their debts on the markets, but
will be dependent on the payments of the other euro
members. This phase will not last for long, as a
renewed expansion of the rescue packages could soon
lead to a downgrading of the creditworthiness of
some guaranteeing euro members. 
The idea of the EFSF and the ESM, created on the
European level, was to raise a guarantee volume that
is so big that the private financial sector would never
lose confidence in the ability of individual euro mem-
bers to repay their financial obligations.1 Of course,
there is no such thing as a hundred percent credibility
and this applies especially to the European level. But
on the national level, i.e. in the case of a legislature
legitimised by elections, such guarantees are political-
ly easy to get accepted and therefore largely credible.
To be sure, the guarantees given to date on the
European level also imply a corresponding liability of
the taxpayers. But to warrant an equivalent measure
of credibility as in the national framework, the indi-
vidual euro members would not only have to have the
right to take hold of the taxpayers in other member
states; all of them would also have to be allowed to
actually raise the corresponding tax revenue from the
other EMU members. This would turn the European
state federation into an economically synchronised
federal state with a strongly centralised budget law.
Aside from the question whether such a unified state
would be politically desirable, this form of political
integration of Europe would be an aberration in
terms of a market economy.2
The aggravation of the European balance of pay-
ments crisis has also provided an argument in favour
of debt restructuring, as this would seem to relieve the
rescue packages. Because of the ‘toxic’ government
bonds still existing in the private financial sector, in
the wake of such credit event there still remains a risk
of contagion that could exacerbate the European bal-
ance of payments crisis to an unfathomable extent. In
particular, debt restructuring imparts the wrong
inducements for new debts, which – as explained
above – can neither be internalised nor effectively con-
strained in the euro area. In the current debt restruc-
turing the financial sector should be involved as much
as possible in order to avoid future moral hazard; the
envisaged sums in Greece appear small. This is less a
question of punishing financial investors than of
dealing normally with nonperforming loans and now
worthless assets, for which the creditor is liable. In a
market economy, this should be a matter of course.
Furthermore, debt restructuring could at least have
the effect that in the future borrowers and lenders will
have a closer look. 
Our discussion shows that neither rescue packages
nor debt restructuring minimise the risk of Euro  -
pean balance of payments crises. Neither can a col-
lectivisation of debt, as is being considered, in the
form of collective debt instruments, the so-called
Eurobonds, solve the problem of debt. Although the
individual burdens are shifted (i.e. the periphery can
shift part of the liabilities to the core countries), this
will not raise the willingness of the creditors to grant
loans at affordable interest rates to the countries of
the euro area. One should not forget that the credi-
tors are still, to a large extent, institutional investors.
These will want to save their assets in any case. The
bigger the potential burden for the core countries,
the bigger will also be the risk premium. It is an illu-
sion to believe that the peripheral countries will be
able to borrow with Eurobonds at German interest
rates. It is rather likely that in the future Germany
itself will have to pay exorbitant interest rates for its
refinancing. 
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1 It is clear that the currently planned volume of the EFSF will not
be sufficient to create this confidence – only a few days after the
Summit decisions of 26 October, the markets were putting pressure
on Italian government bonds again.
2 The same is the case for purchases of government bonds by the
ECB, which is not in accord with the independence of a central
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A few remarks on debt monetization at this stage
seem adequate. It has been suggested by some
American economists and by the financial industry to
use the ECB as provider of an endless 'firewall' by
buying unlimited government bonds on the secondary
market. This is not only a fundamental shift away
from price stability; it also destroys the market for
European government bonds for the years to come.
Thus, we still assume that it is not an option for
European policymakers.
An alternative approach to solving the European 
balance of payments crisis
Ever bigger rescue funds at possibly recurring difficul-
ties regarding imminent debt restructurings of indi-
vidual euro members are not a permanent solution of
the European balance of payments crisis. All past
approaches to solve the problems seem rather to have
the effect of increasing the frequency and extent of
acute balance of payments crises in the euro area.
Alternative and sustained approaches should at least
comprise the following components: first, a restora-
tion of market-compliant price adjustment mecha-
nisms as well as the abolition of inefficient credit
replacement policies; second, understanding about
and enforcement of exit and insolvency rules in the
euro area; and third, implementation of the currently
demanded structural reforms, and the latter not only
in the periphery. Today’s European balance of pay-
ments crisis and the risk of additional crises may in
practice probably only be tackled effectively with a
catalogue of measures. The focus should remain on
dealing with the debt, i.e. the amount of shaky
promises to pay in the future. 
￿ Regarding appropriate measures to restore the
price adjustment mechanisms – e.g. in the form of
significant interest rate differentials on bond mar-
kets – one should be aware that an exclusive focus
on the public debt will not lead to the desired
result, as in the course of a balance of payments
crisis private sector debt will be quickly socialised
(see e.g. the experience in Ireland or Spain). From
the perspective of economic order, far-reaching
market-based approaches should be preferred. The
theory of market failure presents various instru-
ments regarding an effective reduction of external-
ity problems, here e.g. the problem of excessive
debt. Thus, political decision-makers could exoge-
nously fix a preferred rate of credit growth analo-
gous to Friedman’s money supply rule, so that a
market could be created for debt instruments for
the purpose of efficient allocation of debt in the
euro area (see Casella 1999).
￿ In addition, clearly defined exit and insolvency
rules could help to reduce the imponderabilities
and uncertainties that otherwise may occur in the
private financial sector in the course of a emerg-
ing European balance of payments crisis. In  -
terventions as in the form of rescue operations
(bailouts) and insolvency procedures of the pub-
lic authorities should occur explicitly and in con-
formance with rules. The establishment of explic-
it rules for the orderly exit from the euro area
could help to restore the constitutive principle of
liability in the euro area. If such rules could be
instituted in a credible way, all agents would see
clearly in advance the opportunity costs of an
‘misguided’ discount rates and according moral
hazard risks. Furthermore, with corresponding
rules, the scope of some euro members could be
limited to play off their self-made debt problems
against other members in the euro area (Fahrholz
und Wójcik 2010).
￿ Furthermore, existing instruments may be used to
permit fiscal solidity to return to the euro area.
The European heads of governments could meet at
a special summit that focuses on a reactivation and
considerable tightening of the Stability and
Growth Pact in connection with an also intensified
no-bailout clause. The debt brake is a possibility
for enforcing a credible commitment, from the
point of view of the financial markets, of political
decision-makers. The consequence could be a num-
ber of structural reforms on the national level in
order to improve the competitiveness of industry
and to let capital flows be controlled again more by
long-term profit considerations. Besides the earlier
mentioned fiscal aspects, these comprise re-regula-
tion, reduction of subsidies and tax reforms, so
that additional debt will not lead to problems but
to future welfare gains.
In this way, the European balance of payments crisis
and its worsening in early November 2011 could have
at least the positive effect of permitting ‘pathological
learning’ (Karl Deutsch). In history, crises have fre-
quently been the cause of welfare raising reforms, so,
for instance, in England the so-called Glorious
Revolution (Pincus and Robinson 2011). Other exam-
ples of the more recent past are Great Britain, New
Zealand and Australia in the 1980s. These reforms
shared a stronger commitment to rules and limitation
of short-term scopes of action. The weakness of the
present approaches to solving the crisis is the insuffi-cient strategic commitment of political decision mak-
ers. Past measures arose mostly from a situational
political will. If, in fact, we do not follow an alterna-
tive course in Europe in which political control capac-
ities are revoked in favour of market-compliant deci-
sion mechanisms, then past solutions will prove more
and more part of the problem of European balance of
payments crises. The past approach to solving the
European balance of payments crisis leads to a dead
end, when interest rate differentials of government
bonds decline so much that even the last euro member
can no longer get refinancing on private financial
markets. This would not only simply be the end of the
euro as a currency but a climactic event in European
history. It is likely, in any case, that the markets will
force a solution of the European balance of payments
crisis. It is still in the control of policy-makers to let
this solution play out positively. 
References
Casella, A. (1999), Tradable Deficit Permits: Efficient Implementation
of the Stability Pact in the European Monetary Union, Columbia
University, New York City, http://www.columbia.edu/~ac186/
permits.pdf.
Condogn, T. (1998), A Maoist Leap Forward? The Single Currency
and European Political Union, Policy Paper, The Selsdon Group,
http://selsdongroup.co.uk/congdon.pdf.
Fahrholz, C. and A. Freytag (2011), Realwirtschaftliche Aspekte der
gegenwärtigen Krise im Eurosystem: Ursachen, Wirkungen und
Reformansätze, Global Financial Markets Working Paper 21,
http://www.gfinm.de/images/stories/workingpaper21.pdf.
Fahrholz, C. and C. Wójcik (2010), The Bail-Out! Positive Political
Economics of Greek-type Crises in the EMU, CESifo Working Pa  -
per 3178.
Lorenzoni, G. (2008), “Inefficient Credit Booms”, Review of Eco  -
nomic Studies 75, 809–833.
Neumann, M.J.M. (2011), “Notenbankkredite müssen begrenzt wer-
den”, Börsen-Zeitung, 14 July, http://www.boersen-zeitung.de/index.
php?li=1&artid=2011133075.
Pincus, St.C.A. and J.A. Robinson (2011), “What Really Happened
During the Glorious Revolution – and Why It Matters for Current
Fiscal Crises”, VoxEU, 7 August, http://voxeu.org/index.php?q=
node/6837.
Sinn, H.-W. (2011), “Die riskante Kreditersatzpolitik der EZB”,
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 4 May, http://www.faz.net/artikel/
C30638/target-kredite-die-riskante-kreditersatzpolitik-der-ezb-
30335949.html.
Sinn, H.-W. and T. Wollmershäuser (2011), Target-Kredite, Leistungs  -
bilanzsalden und Kapitalverkehr: Der Rettungsschirm der EZB, Ifo
Working Paper 105.
CESifo Forum 2012 82
Special Issue